Paper on "Portfolio Compression in Financial Networks: Incentives and Systemic Risk" accepted at EC'20
2 Postdoc positions and 2 PhD positions available (AI, Machine Learning, Algorithmic Game Theory): apply now!
Paper "Default Ambiguity: Credit Default Swaps Create New Systemic Risks in Financial Networks" published in Management Science
Sven Seuken to Participate in Panel on Machine Learning and/vs. Algorithmic Game Theory at AI Workshop
Sven Seuken to deliver keynote talk on "Market Design meets Machine Learning" at the "AI Finance Summit" in Zurich
Paper "Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Continuous Actions" accepted to IJCAI'17
Paper "Probably Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions via Machine Learning" accepted at AAAI-17
Paper "Finding Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps is PPAD-hard" accepted at ITCS'17
New Working Paper "Finding Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps is PPAD-hard"
Presentation of "An Axiomatic Framework for No-Arbitrage Relationships in Financial Derivatives Markets" at LOFT 2016
Talk on "Partial Strategyproofness: An Axiomatic Approach to Relaxing Strategyproofness for Assignment Mechanisms" at GAMES 2016
Paper "Personalized Hitting Time for InformativeTrust Mechanisms Despite Sybils" accepted at AAMAS'16
Timo Mennle successfully defended his PhD Thesis on "Trade-offs between Strategyproofness and Efficiency of Ordinal Mechanisms"
Talk on "The Pareto Frontier for Random Mechanisms" at the Meeting of COST Action IC1250 on Computational Social Choice
Talk at INFORMS'15 on "New Core-Selecting Payment Rules with Better Fairness and Incentive Properties"
Talk on "Partial Strategyproofness: An Axiomatic Approach to Relaxing Strategyproofness for Assignment Mechanisms" at ESWC'15
Our letter on "Relaxing Strategyproofness in One-Sided Matching" has been published in the ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Our paper "The Adaptive Boston Mechanism" was accepted for presentation at the Matching in Practice workshop in Berlin
New Working Paper "An Axiomatic Approach to Characterizing and Relaxing Strategyproofness of One-sided Matching Mechanisms"