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Department of Informatics Computation and Economics Research Group

Our letter on "Relaxing Strategyproofness in One-Sided Matching" has been published in the ACM SIGecom Exchanges

In our letter on "Relaxing Strategyproofness in One-Sided Matching" we summarize the main results of our paper on partial strategyproofness and demonstrate how they can be used for the design and analysis of matching mechanisms. The need for relaxed notions of strategyproofness has become increasingly appearant as the number of impossibility results in one-sided matching has continued to grow. Our first result is a novel characterization of strategyproof mechanisms by three intuitive axioms. Furthermore, we introduce partial strategyproofness, a new relaxation of strategyproofness that bridges the gap between full and weak strategyproofness. Partial strategyproofness finds application in the incentive analysis of non-strategyproof mechanisms, such as Probabilistic Serial, different variants of the Boston mechanism, and hybrid mechanisms.

PDF version of letter: [pdf]