Lecture: Market Design and Machine Learning (Spring 2021)
|Lecturer:||Prof. Dr. Sven Seuken|
|Teaching Assistant:||Jakob Weissteiner|
|Academic Semester||Spring 2021|
|Time and Location||Wednesday, 10:15-12:00, virtual via Zoom (Link in OLAT course)|
|AP (ECTS):||6 (including a mark)|
|Office Hours||Prof. Dr. Sven Seuken: email for appointments, BIN-2.B.02|
- 24.02.2021: OLAT course is online.
- 24.02.2021: Introduction slides on course overview uploaded.
- 24.02.2021: Schedule uploaded.
- 10.03.2021: Updated revised schedule below and in OLAT
Over the last two decades, the field of market design has developed sophisticated techniques to design practical market mechanisms with good economic and computational properties (taking into that market participants are strategic). At the same time, the field of machine learning has developed more and more powerful techniques to generalize from data, adapt to changing environments, and thereby improve a system’s performance with experience. This course explores how these two seemingly unrelated fields can be usefully combined. In particular, we will discuss how we can use machine learning techniques to design better market mechanisms (like auctions or matching mechanisms) and how we can incorporate machine learning algorithms into the operation of complex marketplaces (like Uber, eBay, or AirBnB) to improve their performance. Students will read key papers from the literature (theoretical and applied) and get hands-on experience by working on a project combining market design with machine learning.
Teaching Format and Setup
The course has two parts. The first part is structured like a PhD-level seminar, where students read a paper each week, write a brief response essay (0.5 pages), and most of the time in class is used for interactive discussions. Each week, one or two students present the week's paper and lead the discussion.
The second part of the course consists of a project that combines market design and machine learning (on which students can work alone or in teams of 2 or 3 students). The projects can extend existing work that combines ML and market design, or they can find news ways of combining ML with market design (e.g., in novel domains). The projects can be theoretical, empirical (using data), or experimental (using simulations). The students are free to choose their own projects. Successful projects will ideally lead to a workshop or conference paper submission.
- 24.02.2021: Introduction: Course Overview pdf (PDF, 402 KB)
- 03.03.2021: How Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market Design (Milgrom & Tadelis , 2019)
- 10.03.2021: Incentive Compatible Regression Learning (Dekel et al., 2010)
- 17.03.2021: Machine Learning powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions (Brero et al., 2021)
- 24.03.2021: Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning (Dütting et al., 2019)
- 31.03.2021: Reinforcement Learning of Simple Indirect Mechanisms (Brero et al., 2021)
- 07.04.2021: Easter Break
- 21.04.2021: The AI Economist: Improving Equality and Productivity with AI Driven Tax Policies (Zheng et al., 2020)
- 28.04.2021: Project Idea Presentations
- 05.05.2021: Dynamic Incentive aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions (Golrezaei et al., 2020)
- 12.05.2021: Estimating Approximate Incentive Compatibility (Balcan et al., 2019)
- 02.06.2021: Project: Final Presentations
This course requires prior knowledge in (1) market design/mechanism design and (2) machine learning. To obtain the prior knowledge for market design, the successful completion of a course covering basic topics on market design (such as auction theory, mechanism design, matching, etc.) is required. Courses with the necessary background include “Economics and Computation” and “Introduction to Market Design” at UZH, as well as “Algorithmic Game Theory” at ETH. To obtain the prior knowledge for machine learning, any introductory course on machine learning is sufficient. Students who have not taken such courses beforehand may be eligible but must contact the instructor ahead of time to request explicit consent.
Recommended for MSc and PhD students.
- Understand how machine learning can be useful in the design of specific market mechanisms and in the design of complex marketplaces
- Understand the difficulties involved when combining machine learning with market design techniques.
- Be able to read advanced research papers.
- Be able to critically reflect on and discuss a advanced research papers.
- Be able to identify how machine learning could help solve a new market design problem.
- Successfully complete a project combining machine learning and market design.
Examination and Grading
- Presentation of papers and leading class discussion: 20%
- Response essays and class participation: 30%
- Project: 50%