Details for Talk on: 13.06.2019

  • Speaker: Nils Olberg
  • Title: Enabling Trade-offs in Machine Learning-based Matching for Refugee Resettlement
  • Abstract: The Swiss State Secretariat for Migration recently announced a pilot project for a machine learning-based assignment process for refugee resettlement. This approach has the potential to substantially increase the overall employment rate of refugees in Switzerland. However, the currently proposed method ignores families’ preferences. We build on this prior work and propose two matching mechanisms that additionally take families’ preferences over locations into account. The first mechanism is strategyproof while the second is not but achieves higher family welfare. Importantly, we parameterize both mechanisms, giving placement officers precise control how to trade off family welfare against overall employment success. Preliminary simulations on synthetic data show that both mechanisms can significantly increase family welfare even with only a small loss on the overall employment rate of refugees.

    This is a practice talk for the ACM/INFORMS Workshop on Market Design.