Requirements Engineering I

Chapter 8

Formal Specification Languages



Chapter roadmap





What is a formal specification?

Requirements models with formal syntax and semantics

The vision

- Analyze the problem
- Specify requirements formally
- Implement by correctness-preserving transformations
- Maintain the specification, no longer the code

Typical languages

- "Pure" Automata / Petri nets
- Algebraic specification
- Temporal logic: LTL, CTL
- Set&predicate-based models: Z, OCL, Alloy, B

What does "formal" mean?

○ Formal calculus, i.e., a specification language with

formally defined syntax

and

- formally defined semantics
- Primarily for specifying functional requirements

Potential forms

- Purely descriptive, e.g., algebraic specification
- Purely constructive, e.g., Petri nets
- Model-based hybrid forms, e.g. Alloy, B, OCL, VDM, Z

- Developed mid 1970ies for specifying complex data types
- Signatures of operations define the syntax
- Axioms (expressions being always true) define semantics
- Axioms describe properties that are invariant
- Purely descriptive and mathematically elegant
- Hard to read

```
TYPE Stack
...
push: (Stack, elem) \rightarrow Stack;
...
\neg full(s) \rightarrow empty(push(s,e)) = false
```

- Over- and underspecification difficult to spot
- Has never made it from research into industrial practice

8.2 Model-based formal specification

- Mathematical model of system state and state change
- Based on sets, relations and logic expressions
- Typical language elements
 - Base sets
 - Relationships (relations, functions)
 - Invariants (predicates)
 - State changes (by relations or functions)
 - Assertions for states

The formal specification language landscape

- VDM Vienna Development Method (Björner and Jones 1978)
- Z (Spivey 1992)
- Alloy (Jackson 2002)
- O TLA+ (Lamport 2003)
- O B (Abrial 2009)
- O OCL (OMG 2014)



- A typical model-based formal language
- Only basic concepts covered here
- More detail in the literature, e.g., Jacky (1997)



The basic elements of Z

O Z is set-based

- Specification consists of sets, types, axioms and schemata
- Types are elementary sets: [Name] [Date] IN
- Sets have a type: Person: P Name Counter: IN
- Axioms define global variables and their (invariant) properties



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The basic elements of Z - 2

o Schemata

Counter

- organize a Z-specification
- constitute a name space

Value, Limit: IN Value ≤ Limit ≤ 65535 - Declaration part: Declaration of state variables

Predicate part:

Name

- Restrictions
- Invariants
- Relationships
- State change

Relations, functions und operations

• Relations and functions are ordered set of tuples:

Order: P (Part x Supplier x Date)

Birthday: Person \rightarrow Date

A subset of all ordered triples (p, s, d) with $p \in Part$, $s \in supplier$, and $d \in Date$

A function assigning a date to a person, representing the person's birthday

State change through operations:



- σS The sets defined in schema S will be changed
- M' State of set M after executing the operation

Mathematical equality, no assignment!

Example: specification of a library system

The library has a stock of books and a set of persons who are library users.

Books in stock may be borrowed.

Library	
Stock: ℙ Book User: ℙ Person lent: Book → Person	
dom lent – Stock	
ran lent \subset User	→ Partial function
	dom Domain
	ran Range
	of a relation

Example: specification of a library system – 2

Books in stock which currently are not lent to somebody may be borrowed

Borrow

∆ Library BookToBeBorrowed?: Book Borrower?: Person

BookToBeBorrowed? \in Stock\ **dom** lent Borrower? \in User lent' = lent \cup {(BookToBeBorrowed?, Borrower?)} Stock' = Stock User' = User

x?x is an input variable $a \in X$ a is an element of set X\Set difference operator \cup Set union operator

Example: specification of a library system – 3

It shall be possible to inquire whether a given book is available

- InquireAvailability

 Ξ Library

 InquiredBook?: Book

 isAvailable!: {yes, no}

 InquiredBook? ∈ Stock

 isAvailable! = if InquiredBook? ∉ dom lent

 then yes else no
 - *E S* The sets defined in schema S can be referenced, but not changed *x*! x is an output variable

Mini-Exercise: Specifying in Z

Specify a system for granting and managing authorizations for a set of individual documents.

The following sets are given:

Authorization
 Stock P Document
 Employee: P Person
 authorized: P (Document x Person)
 prohibited: P (Document x Date)

Specify an operation for granting an employee access to a document as long as access to this document is not prohibited. Use a Z-schema.

8.4 OCL (Object Constraint Language)

• What is OCL?

- A textual formal language
- Serves for making UML models more precise
- Every OCL expression is attached to an UML model element, giving the context for that expression
- Originally developed by IBM as a formal language for expressing integrity constraints (called ICL)
- In 1997 integrated into UML 1.1
- Current standardized version is Version 2.4 of 2014

Why OCL?

- Making UML models more precise
 - Specification of invariants (i.e., additional restrictions) on UML models
 - Specification of the semantics of operations in UML models
- Also usable as a language to query UML models



OCL expressions: invariants

HR_management	~ 0.01 every sector may
Employee personId: Integer {personID > 0}	be part of a UML model element
firstName: String [13] dateOfBirth: Date /age: Integer jobFunction: String 	 Context for OCL expression is given implicitly
	 OCL expression may
context HB manangement. Employee inv	be written separately
self.jobFunction = "driver" implies self.age \geq 18	O Context must be

specified explicitly

OCL expressions: Semantics of operations



Navigation, statements about sets in OCL

 Persons having Clearance level 0 can't be authorized for any document:

context Employee inv: self.clearanceLevel = 0 implies
 self.has->isEmpty()

Navigation from current object to a set of associated objects

Application of a function to a set of objects

Navigation, statements about sets in OCL – 2

More examples:

- The number of documents listed for an employee must be equal to the number of associated authorizations:
 context Employee inv: self.has->size() = self.noOfDocs
- The documents authorized for an employee are different from each other
 context Employee inv: self.has->forAll (a1, a2: Authorization I
 - a1 <> a2 implies a1.concerns.docID <> a2.concerns.docID)
- There are no more than 1000 documents:
 context Document inv: Document.allInstances()->size() ≤ 1000

Summary of important OCL constructs

- Kind and context: context, inv, pre, post
- Boolean logic expressions: and, or, not, implies
- Predicates: exists, forAll
- Alternative: if then else
- Set operations: size(), isEmpty(), notEmpty(), sum(), ...
- Model reflection, e.g., *self.ocllsTypeOf (Employee)* is true in the context of Employee
- Statements about all instances of a class: allInstances()
- Navigation: dot notation
- Operations on sets: arrow notation self.has->size()
- State change: @pre notation
- - noOfDocs =
 - noOfDocs@pre + 1

self.has.date = ...

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Formal specifications enable proofs (e.g., safety invariants)

- Classic proofs (usually supported by theorem proving software) establish that a property can be inferred from a set of given logical statements
- Model checking explores the full state space of a model, demonstrating that a property holds in every possible state
- Classic proofs are still hard and labor-intensive
- + Model checking is fully automatic and produces counterexamples in case of failure
- Exploring the full state state space is frequently infeasible
- + Exploring feasible subsets is a systematic, automated test

Example: Proving a safety property

A (strongly simplified) elevator control system has been modeled with a Petri net as follows:



The property that an elevator never moves with doors open shall be proved

Example: Proving a safety property – 2

The property to be proven can be restated as:

- (P) The places *Door open* and *Elevator moving* never hold tokens at the same time
- Due to the definition of elementary Petri Nets we have
- The transition Move can only fire if Ready to move has a token
- There is at most one token in the cycle Ready to move Elevator moving – Elevator stopped – Door open
- (2) ⇒ If Ready to move or Elevator moving have a token, Door open hasn't one
- If *Door open* has no token, *Door closed* must have one
- (1) & (3) & (4) ⇒ (P)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Mini-Exercise: A circular metro line

A circular metro line with 10 track segments has been modeled in UML and OCL as follows:



Context TrackSegment::
 reachable (a: TrackSegment): Boolean
 post:
 result = (self.to = a) or (self.to.reachable (a))
context TrackSegment inv:
 TrackSegment.allInstances->size = 10

In a circle, every track segment must be reachable from every other track segment (including itself). So we must have:

context TrackSegment inv

(1)

TrackSegment.allInstances->forAll (x, y I x.reachable (y))

a) Falsify this invariant by finding a counter-example

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Mini-Exercise: A circular metro line – 2

Only the following trivial invariant can be proved:

context TrackSegment inv:

TrackSegment.allInstances->forAll (x I x.reachable (x))

b) Prove this invariant using the definition of *reachable*

Obviously, this model of a circular metro line is wrong. The property of being circular is not mapped correctly to the model.

c) How can you modify the model such that the original invariant (1) holds?

8.6 Benefits, limitations, and practical use

Benefits

- Unambiguous by definition
- Fully verifiable
- Important properties can be
 - proven
 - or tested automatically (model checking)

Limitations / problems

- Cost vs. value
- Stakeholders can't read the specification: how to validate?
- Primarily for functional requirements

Role of formal specifications in practice

• Marginally used in practice

- Despite its advantages
- Despite intensive research (dating back to 1977)
- Actual situation today
 - Punctual use possible and reasonable, in particular
 - Safety-critical components
 - Complex distributed systems (Newcombe et al. 2015)
 - However, broad usage
 - not possible (due to validation problems)
 - not reasonable (cost exceeds benefit)

• Alternative: Formalize critical parts of semi-formal models